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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
______________ 
 
No. 13-3641 
_____________ 
  
JOAN C. OAT, 
                                    Appellant 
  
v. 
  
SEWER ENTERPRISES, LTD;  
ESTATE OF LLEWELLYN A. SEWER; 
KATILADY CATERING AND EVENTS, INC. 
_____________ 
 
On Appeal from the District Court 
of the Virgin Islands 
(District Court No.: 3-03-cv-00115) 
District Judge: Juan R. Sanchez 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
May 15, 2014 
______________ 
 
Before: RENDELL, FUENTES and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed: September 12, 2014) 
 
______________ 
 
OPINION 
______________ 
 
 
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
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 Appellant Joan Oat appeals the District Court’s order, filed August 16, 2013, 
denying four motions filed by Oat.  For the reasons discussed below, we will affirm.1  
I. PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
 
   Because we write primarily for the parties who are familiar with the facts and 
procedural history, we recount only the essential facts.   
 In 2007, following a bench trial, the District Court determined that Appellee 
Sewer Enterprises, Ltd. (“SEL”) had defaulted on two notes—dated July 1987 and 
December 1989—held by Oat.  As such, the District Court entered an order in favor of 
Oat (the “June 2007 Order”).  
 The note dated December 1989 (the “December 1989 Note”) was secured by 
SEL’s leasehold interest in Parcels 3h and 3i on Estate Enighed in St. John, Virgin 
Islands.  Thus, the June 2007 Order provided Oat with a money judgment in the amount 
of $554,612.38 and a judgment permitting foreclosure on SEL’s leasehold interest in 
Parcels 3h and 3i. 
 The note dated July 1987 (the “July 1987 Note”) was secured by SEL’s leasehold 
interest in Parcel 3Ae on Estate Enighed in St. John, Virgin Islands, as well as by SEL’s 
leasehold interest in Parcels 3h and 3i.  Notwithstanding, the June 2007 Order provided 
only a money judgment in the amount of $554,612.38, but not a judgment of foreclosure 
 3 
 
relating to the properties securing the July 1987 Note.2 
 On December 17, 2007, the District Court entered a Writ of Execution, which 
directed the U.S. Marshal to take appropriate action to satisfy the money judgments 
obtained by Oat.  Through the sale of the lease relating to Parcels 3h and 3i (the 
“Marshal’s Sale”)3 and recovery of $27,468 from an SEL bank account, Oat was able to 
collect all but roughly $35,000 of the money to which she is entitled.   
Oat then targeted SEL’s leasehold interest in Parcel 3Ae to recover the outstanding 
balance.  To that end, Oat filed a number of motions arguing, inter alia, that SEL had 
forfeited its leasehold interest in Parcel 3Ae, or that Oat was otherwise entitled to have 
SEL’s leasehold interest in Parcel 3Ae assigned to her.  The District Court denied each of 
these motions, finding that Oat’s arguments had no legal basis and otherwise lacked 
merit. 
  Next, between February and July 2013, Oat filed another series of motions asking 
the District Court to, inter alia, (i) vacate the judgment of foreclosure and void the 
Marshal’s Sale of the lease relating to Parcels 3h and 3i; (ii) find that SEL had forfeited 
                                                                                                                                                             
1 We also note that Oat’s opening pro se brief was unopposed, as neither Appellee filed a 
brief in opposition. 
 
2 Oat was also awarded an additional $289,691 in attorney’s fees and expenses and 
$132,000 in interest on the money judgments. 
 
3 On March 30, 2012, the District Court granted Oat’s Motion for an Order Confirming 
the Sale of Security for Judgment (the “March 2012 Order”).   
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its leasehold interest in Parcel 3Ae or that Oat was otherwise entitled to have SEL’s 
leasehold interest in Parcel 3Ae assigned to her; and (iii) dissolve SEL. 4  In an order filed 
August 15, 2013 (the “August 2013 Order”), the District Court denied each of Oat’s 
motions.  This timely appeal followed.  For the reasons set forth below, we will affirm. 
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW  
 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 48 U.S.C. § 1612(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 
1332(a) and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise de novo review 
over questions of law.  See Barclays Invs., Inc. v. St. Croix Estates, 399 F.3d 570, 576 (3d 
Cir. 2005). 
III. ANALYSIS 
 
1.  Oat’s Motions Relating to the Praecipe, Writ of Execution, Judgment of 
Foreclosure and Marshal’s Sale 
 
 Even construing Oat’s pro se pleadings liberally, see, e.g., Higgs v. Att’y Gen. of 
U.S., 655 F.3d 333, 339 (3d Cir. 2011), as this Court must, we find that the District Court 
                                                 
4 Specifically, Oat filed a “Motion to Reconsider Order (Doc. 574) and Pro Se Plaintiff’s 
Third Motion for Relief Under Rules 60(b)(3), 60(b)(4), 60(b)(5) and 60(b)(6) and 
60(d)(3),” a “Motion to Reconsider Order (Doc. 574) and Pro Se Plaintiff’s Third Motion 
for Relief Under Rules 60(b)(3), 60(b)(4), 60(b)(5) and 60(b)(6) and 60(d)(3) 
Resubmitted w/Amended Certificate of Service,” “Pro Se Plaintiff’s Motion to Void Writ 
of Execution; Pro Se Plaintiff’s Motion to Void Order of Foreclosure; and Pro Se 
Plaintiff’s Motion to Void Praecipe and Marshal’s Sale for Failure to Conform with 
FRCP 69,” and “Pro Se Plaintiff’s Motion to Deem Conceded Pro Se Plaintiff’s Motion 
to Void Writ of Execution, Order of Foreclosure, Praecipe and Marshal’s Sale; Motion 
 5 
 
did not abuse its discretion by denying each of Oat’s motions in its August 2013 Order.   
 First, Oat argues that the District Court erred by failing to vacate its prior orders, 
which facilitated the foreclosure on and sale of the lease relating to Parcels 3h and 3i in 
partial satisfaction of Oat’s money judgments. 5  Specifically, Oat argues that instead of 
permitting foreclosure on and sale of the lease relating to Parcels 3h and 3i, the District 
Court should have first required the U.S. Marshal to look to the personal property of SEL 
to satisfy her money judgments.   
 Oat’s argument is without merit.  In connection with SEL’s default on the 
December 1989 Note, the District Court entered a judgment of foreclosure on SEL’s 
leasehold interest in Parcels 3h and 3i, which secured the December 1989 Note.  Under 
Virgin Islands law, this judgment of foreclosure entitled the U.S. Marshal to conduct a 
foreclosure on and sale of the lease to Parcels 3h and 3i and to satisfy Oat’s money 
judgments in part with the proceeds of that sale.  V.I. Code Ann. tit. 5, § 473(1) (“If . . . 
the judgment directs particular property to be sold, it shall require the marshal to sell such 
property and apply the proceeds as directed by the judgment.”).  Thus, it was proper for 
the District Court to enter orders to facilitate the foreclosure on and sale of the lease to 
Parcels 3h and 3i, and the District Court did not err in denying Oat’s motions seeking 
vacatur of those prior orders. 
                                                                                                                                                             
for Decree of Forfeiture and Motion for Order of Dissolution of Corporation.” 
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 Second, Oat argues that, with respect to the money judgment relating to the July 
1987 Note, Oat and the U.S. Marshal took steps to satisfy the outstanding money 
judgment out of the remainder of SEL’s personal property, but to no further avail.  Thus, 
she is now entitled to satisfy that outstanding money judgment via sale of the lease 
relating to Parcel 3Ae.  This argument fails. 
 Although the July 1987 Note was secured in part by SEL’s leasehold interest in 
Parcel 3Ae, the District Court did not grant a judgment of foreclosure relating to that 
leasehold interest, as it had for the leasehold interests securing the December 1989 Note.  
Thus, Virgin Islands law and Rule 69(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
require the U.S. Marshal to first “satisfy the judgment, with interest, out of the personal 
property of such debtor.”  V.I. Code Ann. tit. 5, § 473(1); see also Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 
69(a)(1) (providing that a money judgment must be “enforced by a writ of execution” and 
that “[t]he procedure on execution . . . must accord with the procedure of the state where 
the court is located . . .” i.e., it must accord with Virgin Islands law).  Oat set forth 
insufficient evidence of the U.S. Marshal’s attempts to satisfy the outstanding money 
judgment with SEL’s personal property, and moreover, she failed to demonstrate that 
SEL has no other personal property. Thus, the District Court was correct to reject Oat’s 
argument that she is entitled to foreclosure on and sale of the lease to Parcel 3Ae at this 
juncture.  See, e.g., District Ct. Order, July 6, 2012, ECF No. 552 (“Because it is unclear 
                                                                                                                                                             
5 Specifically, these orders include (i) the Amended Writ of Execution; (ii) the Amended 
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whether Oat has attempted to fully satisfy her money judgment, which now totals 
approximately $35,000, out of SEL’s personal property, Oat may not satisfy her 
judgment out of SEL’s leasehold interest in Parcel 3Ae, unless she can demonstrate to 
this Court SEL has no other personal property.”). 
 Relatedly, Oat argues that SEL forfeited its leasehold interest in Parcel 3Ae, or 
alternatively, that she is entitled to an assignment of this interest.  However, Oat provides 
no viable legal support for these contentions.  Therefore, the District Court did not abuse 
its discretion in rejecting these arguments as well. 
 Third, Oat argues that an order of dissolution should be entered as to SEL.  
However, Oat cannot rely on V.I. Code Ann. tit. 13, § 288 to support that argument.  
Section 288(a) provides that “[a]n action . . . to procure a judgment dissolving a 
corporation . . . may be maintained in the district court by the United States attorney . . .” 
or “by a creditor or stockholder upon proof to the court that the United States attorney 
omits for thirty days after the submission of a verified statement of the facts to maintain 
such an action.”  V.I. Code Ann. tit. 13, § 288(a).  Section 288(a) also provides a number 
of bases upon which such an action can be maintained, including “where the corporation 
is insolvent” or “it has suspended its ordinary and lawful business.”  Id. at § 288(a)(1)-
(2).  Here, even assuming that Oat could bring an action under Section 288(a) as a 
stockholder of SEL, Oat has set forth conclusory statements rather than specific facts 
                                                                                                                                                             
Praecipe; (iii) the June 2007 Order; and (iv) the March 2012 Order. 
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reflecting that SEL should be dissolved pursuant to one of the legal bases set forth in the 
sub-provisions of Section 288(a).  Given Oat’s failure to set forth any other legal basis to 
support her dissolution argument, it must fail. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s denial of Oat’s “Pro 
Se Plaintiff’s Motion to Void Writ of Execution; Pro Se Plaintiff’s Motion to Void Order 
of Foreclosure; and Pro Se Plaintiff’s Motion to Void Praecipe and Marshal’s Sale for 
Failure to Conform with FRCP 69,” and “Pro Se Plaintiff’s Motion to Deem Conceded 
Pro Se Plaintiff’s Motion to Void Writ of Execution, Order of Foreclosure, Praecipe and 
Marshal’s Sale; Motion for Decree of Forfeiture and Motion for Order of Dissolution of 
Corporation.” 
2.  “Motion to Reconsider Order and Third Motion for Relief Under Rules 60(b)(3), 
60(b)(4), 60(b)(5) and 60(b)(6) and 60(d)(3)” and Amended Motion 
 
 Oat also argues that the District Court erred in denying her motions seeking relief 
pursuant to Rule 60(b)(3), 60(b)(4), 60(b)(5), 60(b)(6) and 60(d)(3) of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure.  We disagree.  
 A district court “may relieve a party . . . from a final judgment . . . for the 
following reasons . . . (3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), 
misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the 
judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment 
that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable; or 
(6) any other reason that justifies relief.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).   
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 Importantly, a “movant under Rule 60(b) bears a heavy burden,” and “[w]e view 
Rule 60(b) motions as extraordinary relief which should be granted only where 
extraordinary justifying circumstances are present.”  Bohus v. Beloff, 950 F.2d 919, 930 
(3d Cir. 1991) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).  Relief under Rule 60(b) 
relief should “be reserved for those cases of injustices which . . . are deemed sufficiently 
gross to demand a departure from rigid adherence to the doctrine of res judicata.”  U.S. v. 
Beggerly, 524 U.S. 38, 46 (1998). 
 First, Oat failed to establish the existence of extraordinary circumstances.  Second, 
Oat set forth only conclusory statements, rather than sufficient evidence or case law, to 
establish “fraud . . . misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party,” that the 
judgments rendered by the District Court are void, or that the relevant “judgment has 
been satisfied, released, or discharged,” as is required under Rule 60(b)(3), 60(b)(4), 
60(b)(5) and 60(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  Therefore, the District 
Court did not err, for Oat’s “allegations do not nearly approach [the] demanding 
standard” set forth under Rule 60(b).  See Beggerly, 524 U.S. at 47. 
Furthermore, Rule 60(d)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure does entitle a 
district court to “set aside a judgment for fraud on the court,”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(d)(3).  
Here, however, Oat provided the District Court with no legal basis for doing so.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm. 
